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Political controversy about international economic agreements:  
Lessons for Canada-UK trade negotiations after Brexit 
 
Abstract: The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), if and 
when it occurs, will likely imply that Canada must conclude a new bilateral trade agreement 
with the UK. In the light of recent trends towards an increasing politicization of trade 
negotiations, this policy brief assesses in which respects a Canada-UK agreement could become 
politically controversial. Drawing on explanations for the politicization of recent trade deals, it 
identifies potential flashpoints for political conflict in the Canada-UK trade relationship. It then 
discusses which options policy makers have to channel trade-related controversies into the 
policy process in a way that contributes to inclusive and evidence-based public debates. 
 
Keywords: Canada-UK relations; Brexit; trade and investment agreements; politicization; 
transparency; stakeholder inclusion; communication and framing strategies 
 
Recent political controversies about international economic agreements, including US President 
Donald Trump’s pointed criticism of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
large-scale demonstrations in Europe against the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), have been interpreted in the scholarly literature as indicators of a growing 
politicization of trade relations.1 Political contestation about international economic agreements 
                                                          
1 Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge, TTIP: The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), pp. 93-127; Alasdair R. Young, The New Politics of Trade: Lessons 
from TTIP (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda, 2017), pp. 67-92. 
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is, however, neither a new nor a universal phenomenon. In Canada, the most heated trade-related 
debates occurred in the 1980s about free trade with the US, while the recent conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the EU, the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with ten states in the Asia-Pacific 
region, and the new Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) did not generate much 
public controversy. These examples show that it is important to understand, for scholars as well 
as for policy makers, under which conditions trade agreements become politicized, and how such 
politicization can be anticipated in the policy process. 
 After the conclusion of CETA, CPTPP and CUSMA, the next round of major trade 
negotiations for Canada will likely include a post-Brexit economic agreement with the United 
Kingdom (UK). Even though the precise modalities of UK’s withdrawal from the European 
Union (EU) remain contentious, the British government has clearly expressed its preference for 
leaving both the EU’s single market and customs union. This would imply that CETA no longer 
applies to the Canada-UK relationship, and that a new bilateral trade and investment agreement 
would need to be negotiated. Should we expect political controversy about such an agreement, if 
it becomes necessary? What could be flashpoints of contestation? How can policy makers 
prepare for political controversy, and respond to it when it occurs?  
This policy brief takes up these questions. It first reviews the state of scholarly 
knowledge about factors that lead to the politicization of trade agreements, then applies these 
insights to the Canada-UK economic relationship, and finally discusses options for policy 
makers to productively channel political controversy into the policy process.  
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What accounts for the politicization of trade agreements? 
Scholars of International Relations speak of the politicization of an international agreement (or 
organization) if it becomes salient as a subject of contentious political debate in the citizenry, 
engaging not just policy makers or other experts, but a broader range of societal actors.2 Such 
politicization may manifest itself, inter alia, in parliamentary and media debates, demonstrations 
and other protest events, or social media activity.  
Studies that apply the concept of politicization to international trade have usually focused 
on individual agreements, in recent years especially TTIP. While this research is not 
systematically comparative, it does allow us to identify the specific aspects of trade agreements 
that are particularly likely to cause controversy. It suggests that the most important trigger of 
politicization (or independent variable) is a perceived threat to state sovereignty.3 This threat can 
originate from the scope of the agreement, measured by the range of issues included or the 
                                                          
2 Michael Zürn, Martin Binder and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, “International authority and its politicization”, 
International Theory 4, no. 1 (2013): 69-109; Michael Zürn, “The politicization of world politics and its effects: 
eight propositions”, European Political Science Review 6, no. 1 (2014): 47-71; Pieter de Wilde, Anna Leupold and 
Henning Schmidtke, “Introduction: the differentiated politicisation of European governance”, West European 
Politics 39, no. 1 (2016): 3-22; Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds., Politicising Europe: 
Integration and Mass Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
3 For a general discussion of triggers of politicization, see Edgar Grande and Swen Hutter, “Beyond authority 
transfer: explaining the politicisation of Europe in public debates”, West European Politics 39, no. 1 (2016): 23-43. 
On trade agreements, see Alasdair R. Young, “Not your parents’ trade politics: the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership negotiations”, Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 3 (2016): 345-378; Laurie 
A. Buonnano, “The new trade deals and the mobilisation of civil society organizations: comparing EU and US 
responses”, Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 795-809.  
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economic weight of the negotiating partners, but it can also reflect concerns that the agreement 
undermines a polity’s core values or collective identity. Identity concerns often relate to 
regulatory standards on sensitive issues such as consumer protection, the environment and health 
care, and the labour market. In the case of TTIP, for instance, the debate in Europe focused 
particularly on the alleged threat that the agreement would pose to food safety standards 
(epitomized by the “chlorinated chicken”) and public monopolies on infrastructure and social 
services (including the National Health Service in the UK), as well as provisions for investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) that were seen as giving special rights to transnational 
corporations.4 In addition to these sovereignty-related triggers, politicization can be a result of 
diffusion from a different trade agreement. For instance, CETA became controversial in Europe 
primarily because it was perceived as being similar to TTIP.5 
Once politicization processes have been set in motion, their trajectories in different 
countries depend on a range of conditioning factors (or intervening variables). Which aspects of 
an agreement will become contentious, and in which arenas these debates will occur, depends on 
political opportunity structures, such as the institutions involved in the trade policy process (for 
instance, rules for the involvement of parliaments at various political levels), patterns of public 
                                                          
4 Matthias Bauer, “The political power of evoking fear: the shining example of Germany’s anti-TTIP campaign 
movement”, European View 15, no. 2 (2016): 611-639; Leif Johan Eliasson and Patricia García-Duran, “TTIP 
negotiations: interest groups, anti-TTIP civil society campaigns and public opinion”, Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies 16, no. 2 (2018): 101-116. 
5 Kurt Hübner, Anne-Sophie Deman and Tugce Balik, “EU and trade policy-making: the contentious case of 
CETA”, Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 843-857; Eric White, “The obstacles to concluding the 
EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and lessons for the future”, Global Trade and Customs 
Journal 12, no. 5 (2017): 176-183. 
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opinion towards international trade, as well as resources and strategies of political actors, 
particularly opponents of the trade deal.6  
These considerations suggest a two-step explanatory framework for politicization (Table 
1). In what follows, we will rely on this framework to assess patterns of contestation around a 
potential Canada-UK trade deal. 
Table 1: Explanatory framework for the politicization of trade agreements 
Triggers (independent variables) Conditioning factors (intervening variables) 
▪ Perceived threat to state sovereignty, 
emerging from  
(a) the scope of the agreement, or  
(b) provisions relevant to polity’s core 
values/identities 
▪ Diffusion effects from other agreements 
that are seen as similar 
▪ Political opportunity structures, including  
(a) institutions of trade policy making (e.g., parliamentary 
ratification processes), and  
(b) patterns of public opinion (e.g., perceptions of trade, 
views of negotiating partner) 
▪ Resources and strategies of an agreement’s opponents, 
including finances, alliances with political parties, framing 
strategies employed in discussing an agreement 
                                                          
6 For a general discussion of political opportunity structures in politicization processes, see Pieter de Wilde and 
Michael Zürn, “Can the politicization of European integration be reversed?”, Journal of Common Market Studies 50, 
no. 1 (2012): 137-153. The influence of such factors in trade-related debates is discussed by Andreas Dür and 
Gemma Mateo, “Public opinion and interest group influence: how citizen groups derailed the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement”, Journal of European Public Policy 21, no. 8 (2014): 1199-1217; Davor Jančić, “TTIP and 
legislative-executive relations in EU trade policy”, West European Politics 40, no. 1 (2017): 202-221; Manuela 
Caiani and Paolo Graziano, “Europeanisation and social movements: The case of the stop-TTIP campaign”, 
European Journal of Political Research 57, no. 4 (2018): 1031-1055; Dirk De Bièvre, “The paradox of weakness in 
European trade policy: Contestation and resilience in CETA and TTIP negotiations”, The International Spectator 
53, no. 3 (2018): 70-85. 
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What could be triggers for politicization in a Canada-UK economic agreement? 
The strong economic, political and cultural ties between Canada and the UK may suggest that a 
new trade agreement between both states would not generate much opposition. However, since 
all trade agreements create winners and losers, one should not assume that the negotiations for 
such an agreement would be entirely without controversy. Potential triggers of politicization can 
be predicted by analyzing bilateral trade patterns in connection with political debates in both 
countries about previous trade agreements, including CETA. 
 The UK is by far Canada’s the most important economic partner in the EU. Globally, it 
accounts for 2.8% of Canadian merchandise exports, 6.1% of Canadian service exports, and 
9.2% of Canadian direct investment abroad. It is also an important source of imports (1.5% of 
merchandise imports, 5.3% of service imports) and inflowing direct investment (5.8%).7 
Canada’s exports to the UK are mainly in raw materials and fuel products, as well as machinery, 
while the most important import categories are machinery, vehicles, aircraft and 
pharmaceuticals. In the area of services, Canada has a trade deficit with the UK, which is driven 
primarily by the import of financial and insurance services, as well as construction services.8 
 Canada-UK trade and investment relations are largely liberalized under CETA, and any 
future bilateral agreement can be expected to use that agreement as a baseline. A mere “cutting 
and pasting” from CETA is unlikely to raise concerns about state sovereignty that could trigger 
                                                          
7 Global Affairs Canada, “Trade and investment economic statistics”, https://www.international.gc.ca/economist-
economiste/statistics-statistiques/index.aspx?lang=eng (accessed 5 June 2019). 
8 Department for International Trade, “Impact assessment of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between the European Union and Canada”, 17 May 2018, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2018/82/pdfs/ukia_20180082_en.pdf (accessed 5 June 2019). 
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politicization in either polity. However, political controversy could develop around aspects in 
which a new Canada-UK agreement diverges from CETA. This could be the case if the new 
agreement goes beyond CETA to include sensitive and value-laden economic sectors that have 
proven controversial in previous trade negotiations, such as agriculture and food production 
(including, for instance, the dairy sector), or health care and social services. Political controversy 
could also unfold if one of the partners seeks to restrict market access compared to CETA, for 
instance in fisheries, where the UK government might embrace a more protectionist approach.9 
Finally, negotiators on both sides will face strong pressures in the area of financial services, a 
core sector of the UK economy where significant Canadian investment has occurred, which is 
however now put at risk by the potential loss of EU “passporting” rights.10 
In addition, a Canada-UK trade agreement could also be affected by controversies that 
spill over from debates about national and subnational identities. In Canada, statements by 
Conservative Party leader Andrew Scheer, who has enthusiastically supported Brexit, indicate 
that we might see a broader politicization of Canada-Europe relations, with a strong political and 
identity dimension.11 This politicization reaches beyond trade, but it might come to affect 
                                                          
9 Dan Roberts, “‘We have been hijacked’: fishermen feel used over Brexit”, The Guardian, 23 March 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/mar/23/we-have-been-hijacked-fishermen-feel-used-over-brexit 
(accessed 5 June 2019). 
10 Josh Nye, “Brexit: a new challenge to Canada’s European trade ambitions”, Royal Bank of Canada, October 2017. 
http://www.rbc.com/economics/economic-reports/pdf/other-reports/Brexit_October2017.pdf (accessed 5 June 2019). 
11 Achim Hurrelmann, “Perceptions of Brexit in Canada: Transatlantic relations and domestic politics”, DCU Brexit 
Institute, 2 October 2018, http://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2018/10/perceptions-of-brexit-in-canada-transatlantic-
relations-and-domestic-politics/ (accessed 5 June 2019); Duncan Bell and Srdjan Vucetic, “Brexit, CANZUK, and 
the legacy of empire”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 21, no. 2 (2019): 367-382. 
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economic relations. In addition, subnational identities could become relevant especially in 
Quebec, if the agreement is seen as part of a broader strategy of aligning Canada with the 
“Anglosphere” at the expense of French (or other continental) cultural traditions. In the UK, 
concerns previously raised in the Scottish Parliament about the devolved authorities’ right to 
decide on regulatory standards and public procurement as well as about the protection of Scottish 
food and fisheries products could re-emerge.12 
Last not least, there is a distinct possibility that political controversy about a Canada-UK 
agreement develops as a result of diffusion from a planned trade agreement between the UK and 
the US. Such an agreement will be significantly more controversial in Britain than the Canada-
UK deal.13 Issues that might be politicized in its context, such as food and environmental 
standards, health care systems, or investor-state dispute settlement, may spill over to negotiations 
with Canada. 
 
How can policy makers channel politicization into the policy process? 
Once political controversy about an international agreement has been triggered, policy makers 
are typically hard pressed to quell it. A more productive use of political resources aims not at 
suppressing politicization, but at channeling it into the policy process in a way that contributes to 
                                                          
12 Martin Williams, “Minister says EU free trade deal approval threatens Scots brands and exposes ‘breathtaking 
failure’ by Westminster”, The Herald, 15 February 2017. 
https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/15094952.Minister_says_EU_free_trade_deal_approval_threatens_Scots_bra
nds_and_exposes__breathtaking_failure__by_Westminster/ (accessed 5 June 2019). 
13 George Parker and James Blitz, “Donald Trump sends mixed messages on US-UK trade deal”, Financial Times, 5 
June 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0cc78564-86d0-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 (accessed 5 June 2019). 
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inclusive and evidence-based public debates. In other words, political attention must be devoted 
to the conditioning factors of politicization, which influence its shape and policy impact. Policy 
makers are able to (a) shape the institutional context in which debate about trade agreement 
occurs, and (b) devise communication and framing strategies that allow them to engage in 
meaningful political exchange with critics of the agreement.  
 When devising domestic institutions for debating trade agreements, it is important to 
acknowledge that new-generation trade agreements – ones that involve not just tariffs, but also 
matters like government procurement, intellectual property, and market regulation – have 
brought non-traditional players to the table. These include parliaments, business associations and 
trade unions, subnational jurisdictions, non-governmental organizations, and citizen groups. 
Such actors must be systematically informed and meaningfully included in policy processes. 
Measures to increase transparency and stakeholder input have therefore become part of the 
standard repertoire in modern trade negotiations.14 Three main strategies can be distinguished: 
(1) transparency measures; (2) limited inclusion aimed at building support for policy decisions; 
and (3) open inclusion that allow stakeholders to challenge the status quo.15 Table 2 provides 
examples for mechanisms that can be used in each context.  
                                                          
14 Niels Gheyle and Ferdi De Ville, “How much is enough? Explaining the continuous transparency conflict in 
TTIP”, Politics and Governance 5, no. 3 (2017): 16-28. Stakeholder inclusion mechanisms have been explicitly 
embraced by a number of polities, most prominently the EU in its 2015 trade strategy. See European Commission, 
“Trade for all: towards a more responsible trade and investment policy”, October 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf (accessed 5 June 2019). 
15 This distinction draws on James Organ, “EU citizen participation, openness, and the European Citizens Initiative: 
the TTIP legacy”, Common Market Law Review 54, no. 6 (2017): 1713-1747. See also Evelyn Coremans, “From 
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Table 2: Mechanisms of stakeholder inclusion in the trade policy process 
 Transparency Limited inclusion Open inclusion 
Concept Institutional transparency 
and awareness raising, 
but little or no 
participation 
Transparency as well as 
participation through instruments 
of deliberative and direct 
democracy, but just as means to 
support existing policy decisions 
and effective governance 
Transparency as well as 
participation through instruments 
of deliberative and direct 
democracy that allow interest 
groups to challenge the status quo 
Strategies ▪ Publications, press 
releases, speeches 
▪ Information on 
website 
▪ Use of social media 
▪ Making negotiation 
documents publicly 
available 
▪ Official statistics 
▪ Close-ended consultation 
with limited options for 
replies 
▪ Targeted stakeholder 
involvement 
▪ Targeted public 
hearings/events 
▪ Open ended consultations 
▪ Open stakeholder 
consultations actively 
ensuring participation of a 
diverse range of interests 
▪ Open public hearings 
actively ensuring 
participation of a diverse 
range of interests 
 
The second task for policy makers when trying to channel politicization into trade policy 
concerns communication and framing strategies. What is needed in this context is an 
understanding of which arguments are effective for both proponents and critics of a trade deal. 
Existing research shows that the most powerful arguments tend to be emotional ones, tapping 
into fear of economic costs or loss of national sovereignty in policy-making, especially in key 
                                                          
access to documents to consumption of information: the European Commission transparency policy for the TTIP 
negotiations”, Politics and Governance 5, no. 3 (2017): 29-39. 
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fields such as immigration, food production, or the environment (Table 3).16 Technical 
arguments that focus on the institutional details of a trade deal will likely shape public opinion 
much less than vivid, concrete examples that touch upon the day-to-day concerns of the public. 
In an era of post-truth politics, it should be noted that the power of such arguments does not 
depend on their empirical validity.  
Table 3: Communication strategies in debating trade agreements 
Ingredients of a strong argument Facilitating factors for critics 
of trade deal  
Facilitating factors for 
proponents of trade deal  
▪ Using familiar themes 
▪ Using emotional appeal (especially fear 
and anger) 
▪ Using negative information 
▪ Using non-technical and vivid arguments 
▪ Access to previously used and successful 
campaign materials (through networking) 
▪ Broad scope trade deals 
▪ Agenda setting power of the 
No side 
▪ Availability of the 
“sovereignty” argument 
▪ Access to the anti-
globalization network 
▪ Availability of the 
“economy” argument 
▪ Use of public 
consultations to renew 
the agenda 
                                                          
16 For a general discussion of such strategies, see Michael Pfau and Henry Kenski, Attack Politics: Strategy and 
Defense (New York: Praeger, 1990); Dennis Chong and James Druckman, “Framing public opinion in competitive 
democracies”, American Political Science Review 101, no. 4 (2007): 637-655; Stuart Soroka, Negativity in 
Democratic Politics: Causes and Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Their use in 
recent trade-related conflicts is discussed by Bauer, “Political power of evoking fear”; Eliasson and García-Duran, 
“TTIP negotiations”; Sabina Maria Ciofu and Nicolae Stefanuta, “TTIP, the bullied kid of Twitter”, Georgetown 
Public Policy Review, 14 January 2016, http://gppreview.com/2016/01/14/ttip-twitter-and-how-social-media-is-
defining-the-public-argument/ (accessed 5 June 2019); Gabriel Siles-Brügge, “Transatlantic investor protection as a 
threat to democracy: the potency and limits of an emotive frame”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 30, no. 
5 (2017): 464-488. 
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In the agenda setting process, critics of a trade deal often have an advantage, provided 
that they have the necessary resources. They do not need to be coherent and can attack the 
agreement from multiple angles.17 This is especially the case when the trade deal is 
multidimensional and covers a broad range of issues, providing more ammunition for the 
opposing side. Critics of modern trade agreements have developed a repertoire of arguments that 
have proven to be successful in a number of campaigns. Given the transnational character of 
trade-critical NGOs, we can expect diffusion effects in which strategies that have worked in 
previous campaigns are applied to the Canada-UK context.18 This means that arguments, slogans 
and posters used in the TTIP and CETA cases might reappear. At the same time, previous 
experience shows that, when faced with public opposition, the negotiating parties can use public 
consultation to renew the agenda and increase support for a trade deal.19 Even though the 
emerging solutions might not address all concerns raised by an agreement’s critics, the process 
itself is valued and the proposed solutions often neutralize the opposition to some degree. Such 
consultation must, however, be meaningful; it must ensure unbiased access for a broad range of 
different interests and demonstrate how feedback is reflected in the trade agreement or in 
accompanying legislation.  
 
                                                          
17 Lawrence LeDuc, “Opinion change and voting behaviour in referendums”, European Journal of Political 
Research 41, no. 6 (2002): 711-732; Ece Özlem Atikcan, “Agenda control in EU referendum campaigns: the power 
of the anti-EU side”, European Journal of Political Research 57, no. 1 (2018): 93-115. 
18 Ece Özlem Atikcan, “Diffusion in referendum campaigns: the case of EU constitutional referendums”, Journal of 
European Integration 37, no. 4 (2015): 451-470. 
19 Siles-Brügge, “Transatlantic investor protection”, p. 477. 
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Conclusion 
While the outcome of the Brexit process is still unclear, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU – if 
and when it occurs – will likely necessitate the negotiation of a new bilateral trade agreement 
with Canada. In anticipation of these negotiations, it is important for policy makers to understand 
the conditions under which such agreements become politically contentious among citizens, and 
how such contestation can be addressed in trade negotiations. As we have shown in this policy 
brief, the scope of political controversy about the new Canada-UK agreement will likely be 
limited by the cordial nature of the bilateral relationship, as well as the availability of CETA as a 
template. However, conflicts may develop if the new agreement diverges in significant ways 
from CETA (for instance by including sensitive economic sectors such as agriculture or health 
care); if it is drawn into a broader politicization of Canada’s transatlantic relationships; or if 
connections are established in political discourse that link a Canada-UK agreement to the much 
more controversial negotiations between the UK and the US. Should such conflicts develop, 
certain exaggerated arguments may be raised, which are difficult to debunk in a heated debate.  
Policy makers are hence well advised to incorporate the political dimension of a potential 
Canada-UK trade deal into their strategic planning for the negotiations from the outset. Such an 
approach can entail various elements: The likelihood of public controversy about the agreement 
can be reduced by linking it closely to CETA, by not including sensitive economic issues, and by 
making sure to de-couple the agreement from negotiations involving the US. Political 
controversy can be channeled into the policy process by structuring domestic decision-making 
processes in a way that ensures transparency and stakeholder inclusion. Communication and 
framing strategies can emphasize the benefits of an agreement, while responding in meaningful 
ways to concerns raised by its critics. By approaching post-Brexit trade negotiations with the UK 
14 
 
in this fashion, policy makers would acknowledge that trade policy, in spite of its complex and 
technical character, and even when conducted with a long-standing partner like the UK, cannot 
and should not be comprehensively shielded from controversial public debate.  
